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1. INTRODUCTION

Unquestionably, the doctrine of informed consent is one of the hallmarks of the physician-patient relationship. At a time when the patient is in
need of treatment, the patient is most reliant on the knowledge and skill of the
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physician. The patient needs the physician's services and the physician knows
it. The physician has all of the medical, scientific, and technical information
about the necessary treatment or procedure and the patient knows it. There is
no balance of power in this relationship. In fact, there is a characteristic "imbalance of power, owing to the vulnerability of illness and treatment and physicians' vastly superior knowledge and skills."'
The doctrine of informed consent may, in a sense, act in an effort to level the uneven playing field. It is grounded in patient autonomy 2 and the
notion that unconsented treatment constitutes an intentional tort or negligence. 3 Judge Cardozo's pronouncement in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital,4 that:
[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages,5 has occupied a sacred place
in the law of informed consent. 6 Interestingly, from a historical perspective, there is reliable evidence that medical informed consent
dates back to ancient times. 7
The doctrine of informed consent requires physicians to disclose to patients (without having been asked by the patient) the risks and benefits of, and

1. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICH ER, MEDICAL LIABILITY
AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 200 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2005).
2. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 310 (West Group, 2d ed. 2000).

3. Id. at 311-13.
4. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), superseded by statute N.Y. Public Health Law 5 2805-d
(2010), as recognized in Staroztynyk v. Reich, 871 A.2d 733, 741 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(abrogated in Bing on issue of charitable immunity).
5. Schloendoif 105 N.E. at 93.
6. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing Sch/oendorff and
noting that "[tirue consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice,
and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks
attendant upon each"); Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 378 (Cal. 1993) (citing Schloendorff
and noting that pronouncements such as the one made by Judge Cardozo "predate the recent
rapid advancements in medical technology with their attendant ethical, moral, and social implications").
7. P Dalla-Vorgio et al., Is Consent in Medicine a concept only of Modern Times, 27 J. MED.
ETHIcs 59, 59-61 (2001); Constantinos Trompoukis & John Lascaratos, Surgical Operations During The Ottoman Period: Informed ConsentAccording to Documents of The Ottoman Archives of Crete, 10 T.
KLN.J. MED. ETHICS, L. & HisT. 163,163-67 (2002).
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alternatives to, proposed treatment. 8 The doctrine may be based in common
law9 or in statute.'0
There are various models of informed consent, which have been well described in the literature. Essentially, these are the physician-based and patientbased models." Simplistically, the physician-based model requires disclosure
of "risks, results or alternatives that a reasonable medical practitioner of the
same school, in the same or similar circumstances, would have disclosed,"l 2
while the patient-based model requires disclosure of information material to
the patient's treatment decision.' 3 There are also subcategories of these models that have been discussed.14
The doctrine of informed consent is, regrettably, more significant than it
ought to be. At this point in time, the doctrine might assist the patient to
access information which will remain unknown to all but knowledgeable, curious and inquisitive patients - information concerning the quality of the physician, physician performance, physician economic/research interests, physician illness and disability, operative logistics and operative devices. Yet this is
only the case if the doctrine requires disclosure of this information.
II. CAN A PATIENT ACCESS MEANINGFUL INFORMATION ABOUT A
PHYSICIAN?

Again, it is important to understand that the doctrine of informed consent requires a physician-to-patient disclosure even if the patient seeks no
information from the physician,' 5 that is, asks no questions of the physician
8. Canterbut, 464 F.2d at 783. The classic informed consent case arises from the' lack of
physician voluntary disclosure. For a very recent decision concerning the physician's duty to
disclose physician-specific information following a patient inquiry, see Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d
1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying Wyoming law).
9. See Ficke v. Evangelical Health Systems, 674 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(applying Illinois law and explaining that informed consent is a common law principle).
10. See Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Ga. 2009) (noting that the state of Georgia
does not recognize the common law doctrine of informed consent).
11. See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case For
Shared Medical Deasion-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 480-83 (2006) (discussing both the
physician based and patient based models). See also Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beau-*
Rituak Woman's Sceptre and Prison, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 157, 190 (1997) (mentioning both
models as well).
12. Guebard v.Jabaay, 452 N.E.2d 751, 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
13. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
14. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 480-83.
15. Canterhug, 464 F.2d at 783 ("We discard the thought that the patient should ask for
information before the physician is required to disclose. Caveat emptor is not the norm for the
consumer of medical services. Duty to disclose is more than a call to speak merely on the
patient's request, or merely to answer the patient's questions; it is a duty to volunteer, if necessary, the information the patient needs for intelligent decision. The patient may be ignorant,
confused, overawed by the physician or frightened by the hospital, or even ashamed to inquire.
Perhaps relatively few patients could in any event identify the relevant questions in the absence
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during a pre-treatment or pre-procedure conference with the physician. If the
patient could rely on the physician to provide physician performance, quality,
personal factor and other logistical information through the informed consent
process, the patient would have access to significant information to allow for
more reasoned treatment choices. Unfortunately, as this paper will reveal, this
is, at best, a hit and miss proposition insofar as the informed consent process
is largely shaped by courts. Exacerbating this problem is that this information
is not otherwise routinely available to patients, and physician associations' 6
have not stressed to their members the need to use the informed consent
process to disclose more than the classic "risks of the procedure, its necessity,
and alternative procedures that might be preferable."' 7
It is often considered, wished, hoped, urged or questioned that the modern patient is a healthcare consumer,18 although the characterization of the
Consumers of
patient as consumer is not of totally recent vintage. 9
healthcare need and should have access to quality and performance informaof prior explanation by the physician. Physicians and hospitals have patients of widely divergent socio-economic backgrounds, and a rule which presumes a high degree of sophistication
which many members of society lack is likely to breed gross inequities."). See also Sard v. Hardy,
367 A.2d 525, 543 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (Davidson, J., dissenting) ("It is also the fiducial
quality of the relationship which relieves the patient from the obligation to inform himself."),
rev'd, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977).
16. This paper focuses primarily on the American Medical Association and the American
College of Surgeons.
17. DAN B. DoBBs, THE LAW OF TORTS 653 (2000).
18. See Am. MED. ASs'N, A GUIDE To PATIENT SAFETY IN THE MEDICAL PRACTICE 18
(2008) (noting that "[platients, as consumers, are becoming much better informed and more
concerned about evidence-based medical care, health care, quality, and patient safety") [hereinafter "AMA Guide"]; Robert A. Berenson & Christine K. Cassel, Consumer-Driven Health Care
May Not Be What Patients Need - Caveat Emptor, 301 J. Am. MED. Ass'N. 321, 321-23 (2009) (discussing the modern patient consumer); Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers:
Courts, Contracts, andfThe New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 649-60 (2008) (mentioning the difficulties of the patient as a consumer). See generally Carl E. Schneider & Mark A.
Hall, The PatientIife: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2009) (discussing
the information available to patients as consumers, among many other issues relating to patients
as consumers). See also Gunther Eysenbach & Alejandro R. Jadad, Evidenced-Based Padent Choice
and Consumer Health Informatics in the InternetAge, 3 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e19 (2001) (noting the
difficulty of getting high-quality reliable information about providers); Orna Baron-Epel, Marina Dushenat, and Nurit Friedman, Evaluation of the ConsumerModek Relationship Between Patients'
Expectations, Perceptionsand Saafaction With Care, 13 INT'LJ. QUAuTY HEALTH CARE 317, 317-23
(2001) (discussing the consumer model); Alastair V. Campbell, The Patient as Consumer, 40 BRIT.
J. GEN. PRAc. 131, 131-32 (1990) (discussing generally the patient as a consumer); James C.
Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era,291 J. AM. MED. AS'N. 1880, 188086 (2004) (discussing insurance in relation to the patient as a consumer); James C. Robinson,
Managed Consumerism in Health Care: A new vision for pursuingpublic ends through private means, 24
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1478, 1478-89 (2005) (noting consumerism issues).
19. Leo G. Reeder, The Patient-Centas a Consumer Some Observations on the Changing Professional-CientRelationship, 13 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 406, 406-12 (1972).
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tion about their physicians. Unfortunately, this information is typically unavailable. The Journal of the American Medical Association, in its Clinician's
Corner, recently addressed the need of an executive looking for a new physician and health care system 20 and stated:
[u]nfortunately, Mr. A will find little evidence-based guidance to help
him choose an individual physician. In general, currently available
performance measures do not provide the kind of reliable comparisons among physicians that Mr. A might want. On the other hand,
he can easily find out whether his physician is board certified from
the American Board of Medical Specialists .

. .

. Although studies are

heterogeneous, quality of care and patient outcomes are associated
with physicians' board certification, licensing test results, and certification scores. Mr. A can also check his physicians' licensure status,
public disciplinary history, and sometimes other factors by querying
his state medical board .... 21
There is good reason for the apologetic tone of this statement. There
are, for example, more than 55,000 board certified general surgeons. 22 The
fact of board certification and presumed licensure simply will not provide
patients with information personal to their physicians which could be important in physician choice and treatment decisions.
Perhaps physician groups - voluntary associations, such as the American
Medical Association or American College of Surgeons - could provide quality
and performance information to patients or, at least, assist their members in
disclosing this information in order to provide real substance to the informed
consent process. These associations have substantial membershipS 23 and,
therefore, should be positioned to influence large numbers of practicing physicians.

20. Michael D. Howell, A 37-Year Old Man Tying to Choose a High-Quaity Hospital Reiew of
Hospital.QualiyIndicators, 302 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 2353, 2353 (2009).
21. Id. at 2356. See also Hall & Schneider, supra note 18, at 19, 21.
22. The American Board of Surgery, Diplonate and Examination Statistics - Summary (2009),
http://home.absurgery.org/default.jsp?statsummary.
23. The American Medical Association website does not contain membership statistics.
AMA, http://www.ama-assn.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). AMA membership has been
estimated at 250,000 members. American Medica/Association,ANsWE Rs.COM,
http://www.answers.com/topic/american-medical-association (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). As
of 2005, the estimate was approximately 244,000 members, including medical students. Peggy
Peck, AMA: Membership Bounces Back Slighty, MEDPAGE TODAY (2006),
http://www.medpagetoday.com/MeetingCoverage/AMA/3516.
The American College of
Surgeons has approximately 77,000 members. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS,
http://www.facs.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
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III. THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND INFORMED CONSENT

The American Medical Association (AMA) website 24 contains references
to and the text of patient-physician relationship topics and AMA opinions.
Additionally, the AMA publishes a Code of Medical EthicS 2 5 and A Guide To
Patient Safety in the Medical Practice. 26 These "resources" can be examined
to determine if they provide assistance to patients or physicians on the disclosure of quality and performance information in the informed consent process.
The language of the AMA's patient physician relationship topic, "Informed Consent," 27 is clearly directed to the physician. In relevant part, it
states:
[i]nformed consent is more than simply getting a patient to sign a
written consent form.

It is a process of communication between a

patient and physician that results in the patient's authorization or
agreement to undergo a specific medical intervention.
In the communications process, you, as the physician providing or
performing the treatment and/or procedure (not a delegated representative), should disclose and discuss with your patient:
* The patient's diagnosis, if known;
* The nature and purpose of a proposed treatment or procedure;
* The risks and benefits of a proposed treatment or procedure;
* Alternatives (regardless of their cost or the extent to which the
treatment options are covered by health insurance);
* The risks and benefits of the alternative treatment or procedure;
and
* The risks and benefits of not receiving or undergoing a treatment or procedure.
In turn, your patient should have an opportunity to ask questions to
elicit a better understanding of the treatment or procedure so that he
or she can make an informed decision to proceed or to refuse a particular course of medical intervention.
This communications process, or a variation thereof, is both an ethical obligation and a legal requirement spelled out in statutes and case
law in all 50 states. Providing the patient relevant information has

24.
2010).
25.

AMERICAN MEDICAL AssocIATION, http://www.ama-assn.org/

(last visited Oct. 25,

See generally COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH
ANNOTATIONS (2008-09 ed.) (outlining the code of medical ethics).
26.
27.

AMA Guide, supra note 18.
Informed Consent, Patient Physidan Relationship, AM. MED. Ass'N (2009), http://www.ama-

assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationshiptopics/informed-consent.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
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long been a physician's ethical obligation, but the legal concept of informed consent itself is recent.28
This statement refers to informed consent in a general fashion. There is
no suggestion that the physician reveal any information personal to the physician that might assist in a patient's treatment decision.
The AMA publishes "Opinions" which directly and indirectly relate to
29
the informed consent process. Opinion 8.08-Informed Consent provides:

[tlhe patient's right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if
the patient possesses enough information to enable an informed
choice. The patient should make his or her own determination about
treatment. The physician's obligation is to present the medical facts
accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible for the patient's care and to make recommendations for management in accordance with good medical practice. The physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the therapeutic
alternatives consistent with good medical practice. Informed consent
is a basic policy in both ethics and law that physicians must honor,
unless the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting and harm from failure to treat is imminent. In special circumstances, it may be appropriate to postpone disclosure of information,
(see Opinion E-8.122, "Withholding Information from Patients").
Physicians should sensitively and respectfully disclose all relevant
medical information to patients. The quantity and specificity of this
information should be tailored to meet the preferences and needs of
individual patients. Physicians need not communicate all information
at one time, but should assess the amount of information that patients are capable of receiving at a given time and present the remain30
der when appropriate. (I, II, V, VIII).
It is clear that Opinion 8.08 does not identify the component of informed consent disclosures and, therefore, does not urge the physician to
disclose personal factors which could be significant to the patient.
AMA Opinion 10.01 - Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician
Relationship 3' states:
[f]rom ancient times, physicians have recognized that the health and
well-being of patients depends upon a collaborative effort between
physician and patient. Patients share with physicians the responsibil28.

Id.

29.

Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 8.08 - Informed Consent, AM. MiEn. Ass'N (2009),

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion808.shtml.
30. Id.
31. Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 10.01 - FundamentalElements of the Palient-PhysidanRelationship, AM. MED. Ass'N (2009),

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion1001.shtml.

HeinOnline -- 15 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 24 2010-2011

Informed Consent

25

ity for their own health care. The patient-physician relationship is of
greatest benefit to patients when they bring medical problems to the
attention of their physicians in a timely fashion, provide information
about their medical condition to the best of their ability, and work
with their physicians in a mutually respectful affiance. Physicians can
best contribute to this alliance by serving as their patients ' advocate
and by fostering these rights:
(1) The patient has the right to receive information from physicians
and to discuss the benefits, risks, and costs of appropriate treatment
alternatives. Patients should receive guidance from their physicians as
to the optimal course of action. Patients are also entitled to obtain
copies or summaries of their medical records, to have their questions
answered, to be advised of potential conflicts of interest that their
physicians might have, and to receive independent professional opinions.
(2) The patient has the right to make decisions regarding the health
care that is recommended by his or her physician. Accordingly, patients may accept or refuse any recommended medical treatment.
(3) The patient has the right to courtesy, respect, dignity, responsiveness, and timely attention to his or her needs.
(4) The patient has the right to confidentiality. The physician should
not reveal confidential communications or information without the
consent of the patient, unless provided for by law or by the need to
protect the welfare of the individual or the public interest.
(5) The patient has the right to continuity of health care. The physician has an obligation to cooperate in the coordination of medically
indicated care with other health care providers treating the patient.
The physician may not discontinue treatment of a patient as long
as further treatment is medically indicated, without giving the patient
reasonable assistance and sufficient opportunity to make alternative
arrangements for care.
(6) The patient has a basic right to have available adequate health
care. Physicians, along with the rest of society, should continue to
work toward this goal. Fulfillment of this right is dependent on society providing resources so that no patient is deprived of necessary
care because of an inability to pay for the care. Physicians should
continue their traditional assumption of a part of the responsibility
for the medical care of those who cannot afford essential health care.
Physicians should advocate for patients in dealing with third parties when appropriate. (1,IV, V, VIII, I).32

32.

Id.
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This Opinion refers to the informed consent disclosure components of
risk, benefit and physician conflict of interest. 33 It does not, however, refer to
an obligatory disclosure of physician performance and quality information.
AMA Opinion 10.015 - The Patient-Physician RelationshipM provides:
[t]he practice of medicine, and its embodiment in the clinical encounter between a patient and a physician, is fundamentally a moral activity that arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate
suffering.
A patient-physician relationship exists when a physician serves a patient's medical needs, generally by mutual consent between physician
and patient (or surrogate). In some instances the agreement is implied, such as in emergency care or when physicians provide services
at the request of the treating physician. In rare instances, treatment
without consent may be provided under court order (see Opinion
2.065, "Court-Initiated Medical Treatments in Criminal Cases").
Nevertheless, the physician's obligations to the patient remain intact.
The relationship between patient and physician is based on trust and
gives rise to physicians' ethical obligations to place patients' welfare
above their own self-interest and above obligations to other groups,
and to advocate for their patients' welfare.
Within the patient-physician relationship, a physician is ethically required to use sound medical judgment, holding the best interests of
35
the patient as paramount. (I, II, VI, VIII)
This Opinion refers to the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.
It does not pronounce a need for its member physicians to disclose performance and quality information as part of the informed consent process.
The AMA also publishes "A Guide to Patient Safety in the Medical Prac37
tice," 36 which refers to "The Informed Patient" and the "Patients' Bill of
38
Rights." These sections provide, in relevant part, as follows:
The Informed Patient
Patients, as consumers, are becoming much better informed and
more concerned about evidence-based medical care, health care quality, and patient safety. More and more patients are well informed on
the latest medical advances and treatment and are not afraid to ask informed questions and to challenge physicians as to the reasons for

33.

To regard physician conflict of interest, see Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cakfornia, 793

P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), which will be discussed later in this paper.
34.

Code ofMedical Ethics, Opinion 10.015 - The Patient-PhysidanRelationshi, AI. MED. Ass'N

(2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion10015.shtml.
35. Id.
36. See general# AMA Guide, spra note 18.
37.
38.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19.

HeinOnline -- 15 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 26 2010-2011

27

Informed Consent
their treatment plan, choice of products and drugs, and the use of patient safety measures.
The American Medical Association . . . advocated successfully for
passage of the comprehensive Patient's Bill of Rights Act by Congress in 1998. It ... assures that doctors and patients can openly discuss treatment options ... .39
Patients' Bill of Rights
IV. Participation in Treatment Decisions. You have the right to
know all your treatment options and to participate in decisions about
your care.40
Again, these statements give lip service to the doctrine of informed
consent. They do not encourage physicians to make specific quality
or performance disclosures.

In 2000, the AMA published "Law for Physicians: An Overview of
Medical Legal Issues." 41 It contains a chapter on informed consent. 42 In the
section entitled "Criteria for Valid Consent" 43 the authors state:
[t]he law is now clear in almost every jurisdiction that a physician has
the duty to disclose to the patient, before any treatment or procedure,
sufficient information to enable the patient to make an informed decision.
The major issue is ... what information the physician must provide to
the patient. Courts have generally agreed that the patient must be advised of the nature and purpose of the treatment, the risks and consequences involved, and the alternative courses of treatment, including the consequences of no treatment. The physician must explain
the steps that will be involved and the diagnostic or therapeutic results that are sought.44
In the section entitled "The Amount of Disclosure Required" 45 the authors state:
First, the nature of the patient's condition and the proposed treatment must always be disclosed. The nature and probability of the
material risks must also be described, along with information regardIf the proceing the reasonably expected benefits to the patient ....
dure or treatment the physician is proposing is irreversible, the physi-

39.

Id. at 18.

40.

Id. at 18-19.

41.

LEGAL
42.
43.
44.

See generallyCARL HORN III ET AL., LAW FOR PHYSICIANS: AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL

ISSUES
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

(2000).
93-106.
94-96.
95.

45. Id. at 96.
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cian must so inform the patient. Finally, the physician must explain
to the patient the expected results of no treatment and alternative
treatments . . . . Courts generally agree that risks that are common

knowledge and should already be known to the patient need not be
disclosed. 46
This publication does not advise physicians to disclose personal risk factors, or performance and quality information during the informed consent
process to assist the patient in making treatment choices. In fact, it characterizes informed consent as requiring a "dialogue between patient and physician
in which both parties exchange information and questions culminating in the
47
It cannot
patient's agreement to a specific medical or surgical intervention."
a dianot
require
does
be overemphasized that the informed consent process
48
inquiry.
patient
not
disclosure,
logue. The doctrine requires voluntary
The AMA is in a position to influence the behavior of medical students
and practicing physicians. However, AMA statements and publications do
not suggest the disclosure of physician performance and quality information
during the informed consent process. Although the AMA recognizes the
significance of the informed patient and the physician's obligation to disclose,
the limited scope of AMA pronouncements do too little to advance the doctrine of informed consent in the direction of patient safety.
IV. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS AND INFORMED CONSENT

The American College of Surgeons (ACS) publishes "public information" entitled "Giving Your Informed Consent." 49 This statement, in relevant
part, provides:
[b]efore having your operation, you will be asked to indicate that you
understand the nature of the surgical procedure to be performed and
that you give your permission for the operation.
This may appear to be a formality, but, in fact, this process should be
taken very seriously. Before your operation, frankly discuss with your
surgeon any questions or concerns that you have. Of course, not
everyone wants to know all the specific details of the surgical procedure itself, butyou should seek the answers to questions such as:

*
*
*

What are the indications that have led your doctor to the
opinion that an operation is necessary?
What, if any, alternative treatments are available for your
condition?
What will be the likely result if you don't have the operation?

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 93-94.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Giving Your Informed Consent, Public Informationfrom the American College of SuTgeons, AM.
Cou. OF SURGEONS (2010), http://www.facs.org/public-info/operation/consent.html.
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What are the basic procedures involved in the operation?
What are the risks?
How is the operation expected to improve your health or
quality of life?
Is hospitalization necessary and, if so, how long can you expect to be hospitalized?
What can you expect during your recovery period?
When can you expect to resume normal activities?
Are there likely to be residual effects from the operation?

Of course, your surgeon may volunteer much of this information.
However, if you still have questions, don't hesitate to ask. Remember, the operation is being performed on you, and you should seek
any information that you need to improve your understanding. Your
doctor should be willing to take whatever time is necessary to make
sure that you are fully informed. No doctor can, or should, guarantee
outcomes, because each operation is different, depending upon the
individual condition and response of each patient. Nonetheless, your
surgeon will be able to give you a good idea of what to expect.
The principle of informed consent is endorsed by the American College of Surgeons, the largest organization of surgeons in the world
with more than 54,000 members. The Statements on Prncaples of the
College says, in part, "Patients should understand the indications for
the operation, the risk involved, and the result that it is hoped to attain." 50

The curious nature of this statement is how it appears to place a burden
of inquiry on the patient to obtain knowledge. The statement indicates only
that the physician "may" volunteer much of this information.5t Even so, the
list of questions does not implicate physician performance and quality information.
Recently, the ACS published "I Need an Operation ... Now What? A Patient's Guide to a Safe and Successful Outcome." 52 The section of the book purporting to explain informed consent unfortunately emphasizes written permission
for the operation (consent form) 3 and a discussion with the surgeon regarding the patient's questions or concerns prior to signing the consent form. 54 At

50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. Keep in mind that under the doctrine of informed consent, the obligation to disclose is the physician's. See Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 783 n.36 (indicating that the patient has no
obligation to inquire).
52. THOMAs R. RussEu, AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, I NEED AN OPERATION ... Now
WHAT? A PATIENT'S GUIDE TO A SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME (2008).

53.

For a sample informed consent document, which includes physician and hospital

experience information, see Harlan M. Krumholz, Informed Consent to Promote Patient-Centered
Care, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 1190, 1191 (2010).
54. RUSSELL, supra note 52, at 32.
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55
the end of chapter entitled 'What to Ask the Surgeon at the First Meeting"
there is a list of recommended questions for the patient to ask the surgeon, including:
* "Why do I need an operation?"5 6
* "What are the treatment options?"57
* "What are the risks and benefits?" 58
* "What result can I expect?" 59
* "Who else is on the surgical team?" 60
All of these questions, including the one regarding surgical team members (to be discussed later), relate to matters that should be voluntarily disclosed by the surgeon pursuant to the informed consent disclosure obligation.
The patient does not have the burden to extract this information from the
surgeon.
In the section of this ACS publication entitled "Choosing the Surgeon
Who is Best For You" 61 there is a listing of questions, which a patient is encouraged to ask the surgeon, including:
* "What kind of surgery were you trained to do?" 62
* "Do you have any health problems that would interfere with
your ability to do this operation?" 63
* "What is your percentage success rate with this operation? Do
you have your outcomes in writing?"M
* "What is your safety record regarding complications?" 65
These questions implicate physicians' personal factors such as performance, quality, and disability. Again, why should a patient be required to pry
this information from the physician? A more patient-friendly informed consent process, sponsored by the ACS, would greatly advance the purpose of the
informed consent doctrine by encouraging its membership to disclose more
than simply the classic procedure related risks, benefits, and results.

55.
56.

Id. at 23-34.
Id. at 34.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.
60.

Id.
Id.

61.
62.

Id. at 11-22.
Id. at 22.

63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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V. THE COURTS, INFORMED CONSENT AND THE PHYSICIAN'S OBLIGATION
TO DISCLOSE PERSONAL FACTORS, QUALITY, AND PERFORMANCE
RELATED INFORMATION

Reliance on court opinions in an effort to investigate the breadth of the
informed consent doctrine is not a particularly comforting exercise. A court
will only address an issue facing it in a particular context, at a particular time.
Most medical negligence litigation occurs at the state level. Therefore, there is
a dimension of randomness to this exercise. Nevertheless, without the assistance of key medical associations in expanding informed consent to a more
patient-friendly doctrine, it is necessary to examine court opinions to determine if the doctrine is expanding, even if only randomly to one which will
obligate physicians to disclose more physician-related information to their
patients.
A. Physician Experience
A required disclosure of physician experience potentially entails two
components: (1) overall experience in, for example, performing a procedure
(i.e., how often) and (2) specific cases or outcomes the physician has experienced, including unfortunate outcomes, which if known to the patient would
influence the patient's decision making. Both components are considered in
this paper.
Courts in at least ten states have issued published and unpublished opinions on the informed consent and physician experience issues. 66 These opinions will be reviewed on a state-by-state basis.
1. Connecticut
In Dub v. Flagg,67 the Supreme Court of Connecticut considered the
plight of plaintiff, a pregnant woman expecting her second child. 68 Her first
child was delivered by caesarian section. Plaintiff and Dr. Flagg discussed the
possibility of a vaginal birth after C-section (VBAC).69 They discussed a prior
66. Connecticut: Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15 (Conn. 2006); Degennaro v. Tandon, 873
A.2d 191 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Delaware: Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169 (Del. 1997);
Maryland: Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698 (Md. 2006); New Jersey: Howard v. Univ. of Med.
and Dentistry, 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002); North Carolina: Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d 162 (N.C.
1990); Pennsylvania: Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001); Texas: Avila v. Flangas,
No. 04-95-00106-CV, 1996 WL 63036 (Tex. App. Feb. 14, 1996); Virginia: Tashman v. Gibbs,
556 S.E.2d 772 (Va. 2002); Washington State: Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1997); Housel v. James, 172 P.3d 712 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); Bush v. Stack, No. 41817-31, 1999 WL 364120 (Wash. Ct. App. June 7, 1999); Wisconsin: Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545
N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
67. 905 A.2d at 15.

68.

Id. at 15.

69.

Id. at 16-17.
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bad outcome of VBAC experienced by a -former patient of Dr. Flagg's, although Dr. Flagg did not advise plaintiff that -the bad outcome included the
death of the baby following a uterine rupture. 70 Plaintiff opted for a VBAC. 7'
A VBAC was attempted but "after she displayed possible signs of a uterine rupture," 72 she delivered the baby by C-section. The baby died eight days
after birth. 73
The Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiff was not offering
evidence to suggest that Dr. Flagg's "prior experience with [VBAC] increased
the risks or hazards of that procedure for the plaintiff." 74 Dr. Flagg's prior
experience was not relevant to the Connecticut formula for informed consent
as an objective test.7 5 It was not information "which a reasonable patient
would find material." 7 6
The Appellate Court of Connecticut considered a dental informed consent claim in Degennaro v. Tandom.77 Here, the defendant dentist did not inform the patient (1) that she had no experience in the use of particular equipment in her office78 and (2) that she typically utilized an assistant when performing the procedure.79 During the procedure, plaintiff suffered a tongue
injury, causing "several permanent defects."s 0
The Appellate Court framed the issue as follows, "[w]hether these provider specific facts [inexperience with equipment] can be considered by a jury
for a lack of informed consent claim, where the patient did not request information regarding these facts, presents an issue of first impression in our
state."81
The court held that provider specific information, such as inexperience,
must be disclosed in order to obtain informed consent "where the facts and
circumstances of the particular situation suggest that such information would
be found material by a reasonable patient in making the decision to embark
on a particular course of treatment, regardless of whether the patient has sought to
elicit the informationfrom the provider."82 Although the opinion does not cite to

70. Id. at 19.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Connecticut: Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 17 (Conn. 2006).
73. Id. at 16-18.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 20 (noting that the objective formula for "informed consent involves four specific factors: (1) the nature of the procedure; (2) the risks and hazards of the procedure; (3) the
alternatives to the procedure; and (4) the anticipated benefits of the procedure").
76. Id. at 21.
77. 873 A.2d 191, 191 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
78. Id. at 195.
79. Id.
80. Id. (noting a loss of sensation in the area of injury, loss of taste, lisp, loss of food control, drooling and a tongue scar).
81. Id.at 195-96.
82. Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
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Canterbury v. Spence,83 it makes the point that the process of informed consent
does not entail a patient inquiry as a prerequisite to obtaining provider specific
information.
It should be noted that Degennaro4 earned comment from the Connecticut Supreme Court in Duffy. 85 The Supreme Court commented that the Degennaro opinion did not conflict with the court's opinion in Duffy insofar as the
dentist's undisclosed inexperience with dental equipment was related to the
patient's risks under the circumstances.86
Therefore, case law in Connecticut supports the required disclosure of
health provider "inexperience" to obtain informed consent when the inexperience would increase the risks attendant to the procedure.
2. Delaware
In Barriocanal v. Gibb.87 the Supreme Court of Delaware considered a
medical negligence/wrongful death action involving neurosurgery. Here, the
defendant physician performed brain aneurysm surgery without disclosing
"that he had not performed aneurysm surgery recently, that Christiana Hospital would be thinly staffed the day of surgery since it was Easter Sunday, and
that there were other hospitals in nearby cities that specialized in this type of
surgery."88
The trial court excluded testimony from plaintiffs expert that the defendant should have disclosed this information in the informed consent process.89 The Supreme Court noted that the Delaware law of informed consent
is statutory. 90 The statute defines informed consent as:
the consent of a patient to the performance of health care services by
a health care provider given after the health care provider has informed the patient, to an extent reasonably comprehensible to general lay understanding, of the nature of the proposal procedure or
treatment and of the isks and alternatives to treatment or diagnosis which a
reasonablepatient would consider material to the decision whether or not to undergo the treatment or diagnosis.9'

The Supreme Court noted that since plaintiffs physician-expert witness
identified defendant's non-disclosures as a standard of care violation, the exclusion of this evidence was reversible error.92
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Degennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191, 191 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 22 (Conn. 2006).
Id.
697 A.2d 1169, 1169 (Del. 1997).

88.

Id. at 1170.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1172 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit.18, § 6801 (2008)).
Id. at 1174.
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The opinion is, thus, significant in that it interprets the Delaware informed consent statute to potentially encompass the disclosure of provider
specific information. The key here was that plaintiff could introduce evidence, which linked the non-disclosure to the standard of care.
3. Maryland
In Goldberg v. Boone,93 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered a
medical negligence claim against defendants as a result of a revisionary surgical procedure. Here, the informed consent issue pertained to whether "a surgeon with little expenence in a complex procedure performed close to the
brain had no duty to inform his patient of the abundance of more experienced
specialists available?" 94 Specifically, the defendant physician had performed
one such procedure in the three years prior to the patient's surgery.95
At trial, plaintiff introduced expert medical testimony to substantiate the
prudence of such disclosure of inexperience. 96 The trial court submitted an
informed consent instruction to the jury.97 Judgment was entered for the
plaintiff following the jury trial.98 The Court of Special Appeals "held that a
surgeon does not have a duty to advise a patient that there are more experienced physicians in the locality to perform an operation, and therefore the
trial judge erred in submitted the informed consent question to the jury."99
That court also held that this constituted non-prejudicial error insofar as the
jury found the defendant had negligently performed surgery and that "there
was sufficient evidence presented regarding Dr. Goldberg's relative lack of
experience . . . to warrant that finding. . . ."1oo

The Court of Appeals of Maryland utilized a reasonable patient test to
determine that the breadth of the disclosure by a physician may include "other
considerations,""o0 to be "determined by what information would be material
to a reasonable person in the position of the patient having to decide whether
to submit to the medical treatment [at] issue."102 The court concluded that
due to plaintiffs condition and the inexperience of the defendant physician
(having performed 1 such procedure in the prior 3 years), the defendant phy-

93. 912 A.2d 698, 698 (Md. 2006). As to evidentiary issues arising in the case concerning
cross-examination, see Brigham J. Lundberg, Goldberg v. Boone: Getting Away With 'Mrder" -An Attempt To Exploit The Arbitrag Limits On Cross-ExaminationQuestioning,67 MD. L. Riv. 780
(2008) (analyzing Goldberg, and discussing the facts and the court's reasoning).
94. Goldberg, 912 A.2d at 701.
95. Id. at 717.
96. Id. at 703.
97. Id. at 701.

98. Id. at 701.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 707 (Md. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 716 (citing Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 165 (Md. 2000)).
Id.
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sician had the duty to inform the patient of his relative inexperience. The jury
would then determine if a reasonable person, in plaintiffs position, "would
have deemed this information material to the decision whether to risk having
the [surgery] undertaken by Dr. Goldberg." 0 3
There is quite a difference between the disclosure of experience and inexperience. When is a surgeon experienced? After more than one procedure?
After three or more? The problem is obvious. There are very likely always
physicians "somewhere else" with more experience. How does a physician
become experienced without performing procedures as an inexperienced physician? Will patients always refuse the inexperienced physician such that this
physician cannot gain experience? These issues are worth pondering along
with the discussion of mandatory disclosure.
4. New Jersey
In the context of the physician-patient relationship, the tort of misrepresentation0 4 is not analogous to the physician's failure to obtain informed consent. The Supreme Court examined the distinction in Howard v. Univ. of Med.
and Dentistry of New Jersey. 05 It was during a discussion with a patient and in
response to a question that a neurosurgeon allegedly advised the patient that
he was board certified when he was not.106 The neurosurgeon also denied
that he claimed to have performed a substantial number of specific surgical
procedures during his career as a neurosurgeon.107
Insofar as informed consent was concerned, the court noted that New
Jersey case law "never has held that a doctor has a duty to detail his background and experience as part of the required informed consent disclosure"108
and further stated that "[c]ourts generally have held that claims of lack of informed consent based on a failure to disclose professional-background information are without merit."109 The court did express the view, however, that
physician misrepresentations could "affect the validity of the consent obtained." 10

103. Id. at 717.
104. DOBBs, supra note 17, at 1343-84.
105. 800 A.2d 73, 73 (N.J. 2002).
106. Id. at 76.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 82. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
109. Id. at 83 (citing Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958 (Haw. 1997); Foard v. Jarman,
387 S.E.2d 162, 167 (N.C. 1990)).
110. Howard,800 A.2d at 83.
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5. North Carolina

The
The North Carolina law of informed consent is based in statute.'
statute provides the standard of care and prohibits recovery for lack of informed consent where:
(2) A reasonable person, from the information provided by the health
care provider under the circumstances, would have a general understanding of the procedures or treatments and of the usual and most
frequent risks and hazards inherent in the proposed procedures or
treatments which are recognized and followed by other health care
providers engaged in the same field of practice in the same or similar
communities.112
In Foard v. Jarman,'13 the Supreme Court of North Carolina commented
that "[t]he statute imposes no affirmative duty on the health care provider to
discuss his or her experience . . . ."114
6. Pennsylvania
In Dutty v. Patterson,115 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered an
informed consent claim against a surgeon based upon his less than disclosed
surgical experience. Duttry is another example of a case in which the patient
claimed that the physician was questioned about his experience and misled the
patient with his response.
The court addressed the informed consent issue and simply held "that
evidence of a physician's personal characteristics and experience is irrelevant
to an informed consent claim."" 6 The court recognized the expansion of the
doctrine in other states in other contexts," 7 but refused to join.
7. Texas
In Avila v. Flangas," an unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals of
Texas, the court considered a medical negligence case concerning a referral to
a surgeon for the potential treatment of a seizure disorder. Surgery was recommended and a surgical team was assembled." 9 During the procedure the

111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (West 1985).
112. Id.
113. 387 S.E.2d at 162.
114. Id. at 167.
115. 771 A.2d 1255, 1255 (Pa. 2001).
116. Id. at 1259.
117. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 479 (Cal. 1990); Johnson v.
Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Wis. 1996).
118. No. 04-95-00106-CV, 1996 WL 63036, at *1 (Tex. App. Feb. 14,1996).

119. Id. at *1-2.
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patient "suffered seizure activity and decreased responsiveness," 1 20 as well as
bleeding. Ultimately, the patient became hemiplegic.121
The patient alleged that she did not provide informed consent due to,
among other things, the non-disclosure of "the surgical team's inexperience."1V The court found that physician experience was not a risk "inherent
to the procedure"123 and "cannot form the basis for an informed consent
claim."1 24
8. Virinia
In Tashman v. Gibbs,125 the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the potential for an informed consent claim based upon a physician's failure to disclose his experience. In this case, the defendant performed a gynecological
procedure without disclosing his limited experience.126 The plaintiff did not
"establish by expert testimony that the appropriate standard of care in 1996
for an obstetrician and gynecologist in Virginia required [defendant] to disclose . . . the extent of his experience in performing sacrospinous procedures."l 27 The court did not engage in a policy analysis of informed consent.
The discussion was focused on evidence of the standard of care. Consequently, Virginia law would embrace an informed consent claim based on
non-disclosure of experience if the plaintiff introduces evidence that the standard of care required the disclosure.
9. Washington State
The Court of Appeals of Washington has had multiple opportunities to
consider the non-disclosure of physician experience and the doctrine of informed consent.128
In Whiteside v. Lukson,' 29 the court considered this informed consent issue
in a gallbladder removal case. At the time the defendant physician obtained
plaintiffs consent for surgery, he had never performed a human laparoscopic
cholecystectomy and never so advised his patient.130 Surgery was delayed, by
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id. at *1.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id.
124. Avila v. Flangas, No. 04-95-00106-CV, 1996 WL 63036, at *2 (Tex. App. Feb. 14,
1996).
125. 556 S.E.2d 772, 772 (Va. 2002).
126. Id. at 775-77.
127. Id. at 778.
128. See, e.g., Housel v. James, 172 P.3d 712, 712 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); Bush v. Stack, No.
41817-3-1, 1999 WL 364120 (Wash. Ct. App. June 7, 1999); Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d
1263,1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
129. 947 P.2d at 1263.
130. Id. at 1264.
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which time the surgeon had performed two such procedures.' 3 ' During surgery for the plaintiff, the surgeon misidentified a bile duct and damaged it.132
The case was tried to a jury, which found the surgeon not negligent. The
jury did find that his non-disclosure of inexperience resulted in a failure to
obtain informed consent. 133 The trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") for the surgeon on the basis that "a health care provider's experience is not a material fact of which the patient must be informed."M Washington has a statutory scheme pertaining to informed consent claims.135 It uses the "reasonable patient standard: the physician must
disclose those facts a reasonable person would consider in deciding whether
to consent to the proposed treatment." 36
After referring to case law in other states which have recognized the expansion of the informed consent doctrine to include provider specific disclosures, 137 the court of appeals explained that "Washington courts have not yet
adopted the more expansive construction of the physician's duty to disclose." 38 The Court concluded that "a surgeon's lack of experience in performing a particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for purposes of
finding liability predicated on failure to secure an informed consent." 39
Not long after Whiteside, in an unpublished opinion, Bush v. Stack,140 the
court of appeals followed Whiteside in disposing of an informed consent physician non-disclosure of experience claim. Since the extent of physician's experience is not a material fact under the Washington informed consent statute,
evidence of the physician's experience was inadmissible due to its irrelevance.141
More recently, in Housel v.James,142 the court of appeals considered an informed consent claim against a general surgeon who had performed one type
131. Id. at 1264.
132. Id. at 1264. Bile duct injuries are well-reported complications of laparoscopic cholecystectomy. See, e.g., Charles E. Ray, John F. Hibbeln & Andrew C. Wilbur, Complications After
Iaparoscopic Cholegstectomy: Imaging Findings, 160 AJR 1029, 1029-32 (1993) (discussing the various complications that may arise and providing a number of images of them); S. Lalwani et al.,
Common Bile Duct Injut In Laparoscopic Cholegstectomy: Inherent Risk of Procedure or Medical Neghgence
-A Case Report, 1 WORLDJ. OF LAPAROSCOPIC SURGERY 28, 28-30 (2008) (indicating the risks
of the surgery).
133. Id.
134. Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1263, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
135. WASH. RIv. CODE § 7.70.030 (West 2009); WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.050 (West 2009).
136. Whiteside, 947 P.2d at 1264.
137. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 479 (Cal. 1990); Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md.
1993); Wisconsin: Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Wis. 1996).
138. Whiteside, 947 P.2d at 1264.
139. Id. at 1265.
140. Bush v. Stack, No. 41817-3-1, 1999 WL 364120, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. June 7, 1999).

141.

Id.

142.

Housel v. James, 172 P.3d 712, 712 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
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of hernia repair procedure prior to operating on the plaintiff. The surgeon did
not disclose his operative "inexperience." Plaintiff alleged that the defendant
surgeon "should have informed her of his inexperience because it increased
the risk of surgical complication and led to premature surgery."l 43
Interestingly, the court commented that plaintiff "failed to make an adequate showing that Dr. James's alleged inexperience was a material treatmentrelated fact,"'44 but then stated:
we are not categorically holding that a physician's inexperience is
never material to an informed consent claim. There may well be
situations where evidence of a physician's experience would be a significant factor in a patient's decision to undertake a particular cause
of treatment. But such a situation is not present here.145
When is physician "inexperience" immaterial to a patient's decision to
undergo a surgical procedure? In order to answer this question, the patient
would need to be aware of the surgeon's experience. That will occur if the
physician is required to disclose "experience" in the informed consent process. Otherwise, the patient would be obligated to inquire, which is not contemplated by the informed consent processl46 or the physician would, fortuitously, have to volunteer the information.
10. W'isconsin
In 1996, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Johnson v. Kokemoor, 47
an opinion that revealed the Court's willingness to apply the informed consent
doctrine to physician-specific factors.148 Kokemoor concerned a claim against a
non-board certified neurosurgeon who successfully clipped plaintiffs brain
aneurysm.149 Pre-operatively, the plaintiff had no neurological deficits other
5
than headaches.150 Post-operatively, she was "an incomplete quadriplegic,"1 "
152 "unable to walk or control her bowel and bladder movements ... her vision, speech and upper body coordination are partially impaired." 5 3
143. Id. at 715.
144. Id. at 716.
145. Id.
146. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
147. 545 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Wis. 1996).
148. As will be discussed later in this paper, the Johnson opinion comments on the disclosure of physician risk statistics and the availability of other centers and physicians better able to
perform surgery, as well as physician experience.
149. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d at 498, n. 11.
150. Id. at 498 n. 9.
151. Id. at 499.
152. See Lisa K. Sharp, Philip G. Bashook, Martin S. Lipsky, Sheldon D. Horowitz & Stephen H. Miller, Spedaly Board Certificationand ChlnicalOutcomes: The Missing link, 77 J. ASS'N AM.
MED. C. 534, 534-42 (2002) (indicating a study regarding the association between board certification status and clinical outcomes).
153. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Wis. 1996).
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Although the defendant neurosurgeon had experience with aneurysm
surgery, he "had never operated on a large basilar bifurcation aneurysm such
as the plaintiffs aneurysm."'- He did not disclose this fact to plaintiff. Plaintiff did question the defendant about his experience but his response was
"that he had operated on aneurysms comparable to her aneurysm 'dozens' of
times." 5 5 The trial court admitted into evidence the fact of defendant's inexperience. The Supreme Court approved, stating that "[a] reasonable person in
the plaintiffs position would have considered such information material in
56
making an intelligent and informed decision about the surgery."
Kokemoor portrays a practical problem for physicians with respect to required disclosure of "inexperience." Here, the neurosurgeon had operative
experience but had not performed the specific procedure plaintiff required.
Presumably, he had hospital staff privileges157 to perform the procedure.
Whether the grant of privileges to perform procedures is indicative of competency could be disputed, particularly in view of this neurosurgeon's experience
or lack thereof.
B. Physician Disability & Health (Non-HIV)
Physicians as patients or former patients have a realistic expectation of
confidentiality with respect to their current or former conditions. 58 Should
this remain true if the health of the physician may increase a risk of harm to
the patient? Should the physician disclose his or her health issues in order to
obtain informed consent?
1. Georgia
In Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland,'59 the Supreme Court of Georgia considered the interesting case of a urologist with a history of drug use outside of
work and while not on call.160 Here, the patient consulted with the urologist
for a condition of penile cancer.' 6' The urologist performed surgery and the
patient suffered unfortunate complications and sued the urologist, claiming
that he "negligently performed unnecessary surgery for non-existent penile
154. Id.
155. Id. at 505.
156. Id. Wisconsin has codified its common law approach to the reasonable or prudent
patient standard for informed consent claims. Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (West 2009); Scaria v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine, 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975).
157. FURROW, supra note 2, at 97-98.
158. Id. at 143-71 (discussing medical information and confidentiality).
159. 528 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2000).
160. The "on call" status arises as a condition of the physician's hospital privileges. When
the physician is "on call" he or she is required to consult with physicians who may seek advice.
See Mead v. Legacy Health System, 220 P.3d 118, 120 (Ore. Ct. App. 2009) (considering if a
physician-patient relationship is established with an "on-call" physician after a consult).
161. Albany, 528 S.E.2d at 778.
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cancer."1 62 It was later alleged that the urologist "had fraudulently concealed
or misrepresented his 'illegal use and abuse of cocaine, substance abuse prob3
lem, and impairment."']6
Plaintiff won a verdict on his claim for fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of his cocaine use at the time of surgery. However, the trial
court entered JNOV for the defendant, holding he had no duty to disclose his
substance abuse.'6 The Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court of
Georgia "granted certiorari to determine: (1) [w]hether there exists a duty
arising from all professional relationships to disclose any factor or factors of
the professional's life which might adversely affect the professional's performance; (2) [w]hether the failure to disclose such factors supports an action
for fraud and battery."1 65
The Supreme Court commented upon the Georgia history of the law of
informed consent. The common law did not recognize the claim such that if
a patient did not inquire of potential surgical risks, the physician had no duty
to volunteer.166 The common law rule was changed in 1988 by statute 67 but
the "statutory list of mandatory disclosures does not include a requirement
that physicians disclose to their patients any aspect of their personal lives
which might adversely affect their professional performance." 68
In concluding that the court of appeals erroneously held that the defendant had the duty under Georgia common law or statute "to disclose his drug
use to his patients prior to rendering services,"' 69 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Georgia informed consent statute "is in derogation of
the common law rule against requiring physicians to disclose medical risks to
their patients,"o70 requires strict construction "and cannot be extended beyond
its plain and explicit terms."171 The Supreme Court did not discount the evidence of illicit drug use as relevant to a medical negligence claim but it would
not support an independent cause of action.172
2. Louisiana
In Hidding v. Williams,173 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana was receptive
to an informed consent claim based on a physician's non-disclosure of his
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id
Id. at 779.
Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 779 (Ga. 2000).
Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (West 2009).
Albany, 528 S.E.2d at 780.
Id.
Id.
Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 780 (Ga. 2000).
Id. at 781.
578 So. 2d 1192, 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
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chronic alcohol abuse. Hidding involved an orthopedic surgical procedure
with attendant, severe neurological consequences.174 The defendant surgeon
had not disclosed to plaintiff that he "was suffering from alcohol abuse at the
time of the surgery." 75
At trial, there was substantial testimony and other evidence as to the surgeon's prior medical license suspension, 7 6 the impact of chronic alcoholism, 17 7 history of alcoholism, 78 how alcoholism impacted his home and family
life' 79 and his divorce. 80 The defendant testified at trial that "he is not dependent on alcohol and has never been an alcohol abuser,"' 8' and "contended
that the license suspension was based on unsubstantiated hearsay."1 82
The court agreed with the trial judge's finding that the surgeon's "failure
to disclose his chronic alcohol abuse to [the patient and his wife] vitiated their
consent to surgery."1 83 The defendant's chronic alcohol abuse created "a material risk associated with the surgeon's ability to perform, which if disclosed
would have obliged the patient to have elected another course of treatment."M
A relatively recent study addresses alcohol use by physicians while on
duty.185 The study refers to a difference of opinion among physicians as to
the obligation to "tell a patient if they have taken alcohol before treating
them."' 86 The study refers to the doctrine of informed consent and notes
"that most patients want to know" 87 about physician alcohol use while on
duty.
3. Tennessee
In Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopedic Group,'88 the informed consent issue
concerned an orthopedic surgeon's failure to disclose his affliction with Ray-

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1196-97.
Id
Id.
Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id
Id at 1196.

184. Id.
185. See general# Norman A. Desbiens, Mukta Panda, Neema Doshi & James Peterman,
Public Perceptions ofAlcohol Use by Physicians, 98 S. MED. J. 5 (2005) (assessing public perceptions
of alcohol use by physicians on duty using a random telephone survey of 408 adults in one
Tennessee county).

186.
187.
188.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
45 S.W.3d 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
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naud's Syndrome,189 affecting his hand. The surgeon had performed a right
total hip replacement for plaintiff, who was unsatisfied with the results and
filed suit.190 Apparently, the surgeon's health condition was learned through
the discovery process. 91
The Court of Appeals referred to plaintiffs allegations that "a surgeon,
suffers from a hand condition that affects the use of those hands"192 and that
this information should have been disclosed under the Tennessee Medical
Malpractice Act. 193 The court of appeals held that "an informed consent malpractice action" was alleged.194
4. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has taken the position that a physician's prior health history or prior drug and alcohol abuse are not subject to
disclosure insofar as there is no current increased risk to the patient.195 In
May v. Cusick,' 96 the patient sued a surgeon and claimed that pursuant to the
Wisconsin informed consent statute'97 the surgeon's failure to disclose his
history of strokes resulted in a lack of informed consent. The two strokes
were "slight,"' 9 8 and occurred some years prior to plaintiff's operation.199
The court of appeals reasoned that the surgeon "had made a complete recovery from his earlier strokes and had suffered no residual effects. Thus, the
doctor's health history was not material because a reasonable person would
not have attached any significance to it." 200
Similarly, in Mau v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,201 the same court
held that a surgeon was not obligated to disclose to the patient his history of
drug and alcohol problems, since this information "has no relevance to a particular course of treatment." 202 There was evidence showing that the surgeon
"had not been using drugs in the months before, during and after [the pa189. See Gregory J. Landry et al., Locng-term Outcome of Raynaud's Syndrome in a Pmspectivey
Analyed Patient Cohort, 23J. VASCULAR SURGERY 76 (1996) (discussing the potential progression
of the disease process which may include serious hand conditions).
190. Hawk, 45 S.W.3d at 24.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 33.
193. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 etseq. (West 1980).
194. Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Grp., 45 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
195. May v. Cusick, No. 99-2520, 2001 WL 436286 (Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2001) (discussing
the history of stroke); Mau v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, No. 02-0244, 2003 WL
21706407 (Wis.App. July 24, 2003) (noting the history of drug and alcohol abuse).
196. 2001 WL 43686, at *1
197. Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (West 2005).
198. May, 2001 WL 43686, at *5.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. No. 02-0244, 2003 WL 21706407 (Wis. Ct. App. July 24, 2003).
202. Id. at *2.
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tient's] surgery, a fact substantiated by random drug testing." 203 Therefore,
the surgeon was not obligated to disclose "his history of drug and alcohol
abuse under the informed consent law because [he] was not using those substances during the period in which he operated on [plaintiffJ." 204
5. Pennylvania
Kaskie v. Wright,205 concerned a medical negligence action against a surgeon who did not disclose his alcoholism to the patient. The Supreme Court
identified its inquiry as "whether the patient was made aware of all material
risks which are collateral to a given procedure, including, at least 'the nature of
the operation to be performed, the seriousness of it, the organs of the body
involved, the disease or incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results."' 206 Referring to the physician's alleged alcoholism as "some alleged
characteristics of the person performing [the procedure]," 207 the court simply
refused to expand the doctrine of informed consent to "matters not specifically germane to surgical or operative treatment." 208 The court asked the central question as follows: "[a]re patients to be informed of every fact which
might conceivably affect performance in the surgical suite?" 209 It answered
the question by stating,
[m]atters such as personal weakness and professional credentials of
those who provide healthcare are the responsibility of the hospital
employing them, the professional corporations who offer their services, or the associations which are charged with oversight. Their failure to fulfill their obligations in this regard becomes a matter of negligence, and it is from them that recovery must be sought. 210
This commentary suggests that the court minimizes the direct disclosure
of information that would likely be of interest to a patient. That disclosure is
not the obligation of the physician seems to enforce physician paternalism, a
target of the "patient as consumer" concept.
6. Alberta, Canada
The Alberta Court of Appeal has weighed in on the obligation of a surgeon to disclose a personal health history of epilepsy in order to obtain in-

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
589 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1991).
Id. at 216 (quoting Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1996)).
Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 216.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.
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formed consent. In Halkyard v. Mathew,211 the defendant Ob-Gyn performed
a total hysterectomy for the patient. After post-operative complications and
subsequent surgery, the patient died. 212 The Ob-Gyn had epilepsy but suffered neither an epileptic seizure nor complication of his epilepsy medication.
The physician's epilepsy did not contribute to his patient's death.213
The court undertook a rather curious analysis when compared with the
law of informed consent more typical in the states. Plaintiff urged the court
to look to the physician's non-disclosure of his epilepsy as sufficient to vitiate
consent.214 Had the patient been advised of the epileptic condition, consent
would not have been given. 215 The court also noted that the patient, a nurse,
with the knowledge of her physician's condition, would have consulted another surgeon.216 The court doubted that the evidence proved that the patient
would have refused her consent if she knew of her physician's health. 217
The court then focused on causation and stated that,
"we do not accept that the law in Canada imposes any liability in negligence on a doctor who fails to disclose his personal medical problems in a
case where those medical problems cause no harm to the patient. When harm
is caused by the lack of disclosure, liability in negligence may arise." 218
Of course, if the law requires a nexus between the undisclosed condition
and the patient injury, the law would trivialize the non-disclosure. If, as the
court suggests, battery claims are limited "to cases where surgery or treatment
has been performed or given to which there has been no consent at all or
where ... surgery or treatment has been performed or given beyond that to
which there was consent," 219 that the patient would not have consented to
treatment with knowledge of the physician's health would not support a battery claim. Apparently, only the use of fraud or misrepresentation to secure
the patient's consent would support a battery claim. 220
The Halkyard2 opinion essentially constitutes a "hindsight" approach to
the physician's disclosure of a personal health condition. If the duty to disclose is premised upon a causal relationship between the physician's health
and injury suffered by the patient, the informed consent process is undermined. The patient is not required to be injured by the health risk; rather, the
injury is that the patient was not given information which might lead to the
patient's refusal to have the procedure or to the patient's choice of another
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

[20011 91 Alta. L.R.3d 201 (Can.).
Id.at para. 2.
Id. at para. 4.
Id.at para. 5.
Id. at para. 5, 10.
Id. at para. 10.
Halkyard v. Mathew, [2001] 91 Alta. L.R.3d 201, para. 10 (Can.).
Id. at para. 11.
Id. at para. 7. (citing Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880, 890-92 (Can.)).
Halkyard, 91 Alta L.R.3d at para. 12.
Id.
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physician. Halkyard22 has been the subject of comment,223 Some of which
questions the limit of the informed consent doctrine if provider-specific
health must be disclosed.
C. HIV
The intersection of the HIV+ physician and the doctrine of informed
consent has formed the basis for passionate debate. If HIV+ physicians have
a duty to disclose this status to patients in order to obtain informed consent,224 it is only a short step to requiring physicians who engage in invasive
procedures to submit to mandatory HIV testing. This position has been advocated.225
Before examining case law, it is important to examine opinions and recommendations of influential medical organizations to determine if they are
advocating the disclosure of physician HIV positivity in the informed consent
process. The positions of the American Medical Association, the American
College of Surgeons, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the Centers for Disease Control will be explored.
The AMA published an Opinion concerning, in part, HIV infected physicians. 226 This Opinion, in relevant part, provides:
[a] physician who knows that he or she is seropositive should not engage in any activity that creates a significant risk of transmission of
the disease to others. A physician who has HIV disease or who is seropositive should consult a colleagues as to which activities the physi227
cian can pursue without creating a risk to patients.

222. Id.
223. See general# Brenda J. Johnson, Recent Decisions: Must Doctors Disclose Their Own Personal
Risk Factors? Halkyardv. Mathew, 10 HEALTH L. REv. 18 (2001) (discussing the Halkyarddecision
and imposing requirements on doctors to disclose information to patients about themselves);
Cynthia Heinz, How Much Is Enough? Patients' Rsght-To-Know Versus Privag Rights Of Healthcare
Providers,7 LEGAL Focus ON RISK & INS. STRATEGIES 81 (2007) (noting basic negligence principles).
224. See Theodore R. LeBlang, Obhgations of HI V-Infected Health Professionals to Inform Patients
of Their Serological Status: Evolving Theones of Liability, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 317, 326 (1994)
(recognizing "an obligation for physicians to respond truthfully to specific inquiries from patients regarding their HIV status"). See generally Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS, Infected Surgeons
and Dentists, and the Medical Profession'sBetnyal of its Responsibility to Patients,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
57 (1996) (arguing for mandatory disclosure and discussing the cases where courts have considered the issue).
225. See generally Michael L. Closen, A Callfor Mandatog HIV Testing and Restriction of Certain
Health Care Professionals,9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 421 (1990).
226. Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 9.13 - HIV-Infected Patientsand Physicians, AM. MED). Ass'N
(1998), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion9l3.shtml.
227. Id.
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Clearly, this opinion neither mandates nor recommends that an HIV+
physician disclose this status to a patient in order to obtain informed consent.
The American College of Surgeons has published a lengthy "Statement on
the Surgeon and HIV Infection."22 8 It provides, in relevant part:
[blecause the disease is blood-borne and transmissible, and due to the
nature of surgical work, a concerned surgical community has become
involved and has offered leadership in developing enhanced sterile
surgical barriers, and improved surgical techniques and procedures.
Surgeons are at-risk for exposure to HIV and are concerned about
this risk. Patients have been concerned about their potential risk of
exposure to HIV infection from blood transfusions, other patients,
health care workers, and surgeons.
There has been no documented transmission of HIV infection in the
performance of surgical treatment from a surgeon to a patient to this
date.
Guidelines published in July 1991 by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) have been widely distributed and have not
been amended or changed since that time. The College has expressed
concern that these actions were not based upon direct scientific data,
were not cost-effective, and were intrusive to the extreme. We continue to feel that the recommendations of defining "risk-prone procedures," as was recommended by the CDC, cannot be determined in
a scientific or rational way. We have felt, and continue to feel, that
these recommendations were irrelevant and counterproductive. In
formulating these guidelines, the CDC ignored the overwhelming testimony of the scientific community, and the fact that all currently
available data indicate that transmission from surgeon to patient in a
hospital setting continues to be a hypothetical event.
While basic, clinical, and epidemiological research continues, a number of issues remain unresolved. The surgical community emphasizes
that available scientific data indicate that transmission of HIV infection from physician, surgeon, or nurse to patient is extremely rare.
The overall risk of transmission of HIV from infected surgeons to
patients appears to be so low that costly measures, such as testing and
limiting of work, are not justified. This is especially true now that
antiretroviral therapy has advanced to a level to make many infected
individuals virtually free of virus in their blood.
We continue to believe in operating room behavior that will minimize
the risk of transmission of HIV or any other blood-borne or environmentally transmissible pathogen. We believe in enforcing a high
standard of infection control and universal precautions, which remain
228. Statement on the Surgeon and FIV Infection, ST 13, AMERicAN
(2010), http://www.facs.org/fellows info/statements/st-13.html.

COILEGE OF SURGEONS
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the best strategy for protecting patients and surgeons from accidental
exposure. We should continue to emphasize the absence of scientific
data about any transmissions in the operating room environment, so
that a healthy atmosphere can be maintained in the minds of patients
and the public regarding the problem of HIV transmission. Any
regulatory efforts should be based solely on documented scientific
data and not on unfounded hysteria.
While therapy for HIV infection has not resulted in eradication of the
disease, effective combination antiretroviral therapy is available that
reduces antigenemia from the infection, improves quality of life, and
appears to significantly improve life expectancy. Surgeons should
know their HIV serologic status in the same way that they would
want to have knowledge of any other disease about which they may
have personal concerns. This personal and confidential information
about HIV infection would allow the surgeon to obtain important
treatment and counseling for his or her own personal health, and
should not be used for any determinations of credentialing or privileging for surgical practice.
Based on data that are currently available, we make the following recommendations:
1. Surgeons have the same ethical obligations to render care to HIVinfected patients as they have to care for other patients.
2. Surgeons should utilize the highest standards of infection control,
involving the most effective known sterile barriers, universal precautions, and scientifically accepted infection control practices. This
practice should extend to all sites where surgical care is rendered and
to all patients who receive surgical care.
3. Based on data in the current literature, HIV-infected surgeons may
continue to practice and perform invasive procedures and surgical
operations unless there is clear evidence that a significant risk of
transmission of infection exists through an inability to meet basic infection control procedures, or the surgeon is functionally unable to
care for patients. These determinations are to be made by the surgeon's personal physician and/or an institutional panel so designated
for confidential counseling. Such a panel should be composed of infectious disease specialists, surgeons, and other health care professionals who are knowledgeable about blood-borne infections.
4. Postexposure prophylaxis with antiretroviral chemotherapy is recommended. Counseling and recommendations for surgeons are
available through the National Clinicians' Postexposure Hotline at
1888- 448-4911, or at http://www.ucsf.edu/hivcntr.
5. Surgeons should know their own status for HIV infection, as they
would be knowledgeable about any other disease or illness that is of
concern to them personally. Treatment of HIV infection, while not
curative, has been effective and is recommended. Knowledge of the
HIV infection status of the individual is not to be used in the deter-
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mination of suitability of the surgeon for surgical practice. The HIV
status of a surgeon is personal health information and does not need
to be disclosed to anyone.
6. Various College committees should continue to consider the concerns and problems of HIV- infected surgeons and their families in
their deliberations. The College committees will continue to monitor
new developments in HIV infection and its treatment to optimize patient safety and safety in surgical practice. 229
This ACS statement neither discourages HIV+ surgeons from performing invasive procedures nor requires that they disclose their HIV
status to patients as a component of the informed consent process.
The ACS statement essentially dismisses the CDC's July 1991 recommendations, 230 including that which states:
HCWs [Health Care Workers] who are infected with HIV ... should
not perform exposure-prone procedures unless they have sought
counsel from an expert review panel and been advised under what
circumstances, if any, they may continue to perform these procedures. Such circumstances would include noti ing prospective patients of the
2 31

HCW's seropositivity before they undergo exposure-prone invasive procedures.

Therefore, the CDC recommends physician disclosure of seropositivity
to patients, and the ACS does not.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), an
organization of more than 51,000 members, 232 has spoken on the topic of the
HIV+ Ob-Gyn. The ACOG Code of Professional Ethics advises that:
5. The obstetrician-gynecologist who has reason to believe that he or
she is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) ...
should voluntarily be treated for the protection of his or her patients.
In making decisions about patient care activities, a physician infected
with such an agent should adhere to the fundamental professional ob233
ligation to avoid harm to patients.
Although this ethical obligation
ACOG's Committee Opinion on the
contain the following: "[i]f physicians
risk of harm, they have no obligation

229.

does not refer to informed consent,
Human Immunodeficiency Virus does
avoid procedures that place patients at
to inform the patient of their positive

Id. (emphasis added).

230. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Recommendaionfor Preventing Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients DuringExposure-ProneInvasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1, 1-9 (1991).

231.

Id. at 5. (emphasis added).

232.

ACOG

FactSheet, AM. CoIu. OF OBsTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGIsr

(2010)

http://www.acog.org/from home/ACOGFactSheet.pdf.
233. Code of ProfessionalEthics of the Amecan College of Obsteticians and Gynecologists, Am. COLL.
OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (2008),
http://www.acog.org/from-home/acogcode.pdf.
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HIV serostatus." 234 This statement recognizes -the need for disclosure by the
Ob-Gyn to the patient if a risk of transmission to the patient is inherent in the
procedure.
With the varying positions of influential medical organizations as a background, judicial opinions will be explored.
1. Maryland
Faya v. Almara 3 s concerned an HIV+ oncological surgeon who performed breast surgery without disclosing his HIV status to patients. The surgeon subsequently died of AIDS and, thereafter, his patients learned of the
236
circumstances of his death from a newspaper account.
Complaints for medical negligence were filed against the surgeon, including informed consent claims. The Court of Appeals of Maryland found that
the surgeon "was negligent in failing to disclose his HIV-positive status before
operating on Faya and Rossi." 237 The foreseeability of transmission despite its
low risk was central to the decision. 238
2. Minnesota
In K.A.C v. Benson,239 the Supreme Court of Minnesota had the opportunity to resolve the HIV+ physician disclosure issue but chose not to do so.
Here, the defendant was a family practice physician who performed gynecological procedures while HIV+. 240 His dermatologist reported his HIV status
to the state medical board, which "advised [him] to wear two pairs of gloves
when caring for patients and to refrain from performing surgery," 241 which he
did. Later, the board restricted the defendant "from delivering babies, from
performing surgery, or performing invasive procedures using a sharp instrument in a patient's body cavity." 242 Thereafter, the board contacted patients
of the defendant by letter, signed by the defendant to alert them of the defendant's diagnosis. 243
The claims considered by the Supreme Court were battery and negligent
nondisclosure, premised upon the defendant's nondisclosure of his HIV

234. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee of Ethics, ACOG Committee
Opinion No. 389: Human Immunodefideny Virus, 110 OBSTETRics & GYNIECOI.OGY 1473, 1477
(2007).
235. 620 A.2d 327, 327 (Md. 1993).
236. Id at 329.
237. Id. at 333.
238. Id.
239. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
240. Id. at 553.
241. Id. at 556.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 556-57.
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status. Apparently, one plaintiff inquired of defendant's weight loss and skin
condition. 244 Defendant's explanation did not include his HIV+ status. 245
As to the battery claim, the court noted that the defendant neither "performed a different procedure from that to which [plaintiff] consented" 246 nor
"significantly increase[d] the risk that T.M.W. would contract HIV." 24 7 As
such, he did not fail "to disclose a material aspect of the nature and character
2
of the procedure performed." 248 The battery claim failed. 49
With respect to the negligent nondisclosure claim, the court was not anxious to reach the issue of whether a physician is obligated to disclose his HIV
status to his patient. The court stated:
[w]hether or not Dr. Benson had a legal duty to disclose his HIV status to his patients, the breach of a legal duty without compensable
damages recognized by law is not actionable. Here, the undisclosed,
miniscule 'risk' of HIV exposure did not materialize in harm to plaintiff because T.M.W. tested negative for the HIV antibody. Therefore,
T.M.W.'s claim for negligent nondisclosure fails.250
The court used a "hindsight approach" to avoid addressing the informed
consent issue. If an informed consent based claim is viable only upon the
materialization of the undisclosed risk (transmission of HIV), the gist of the
claim that, with knowledge of the risk, the patient would have opted for a
different physician, is marginalized.
3. New Jersey
In Estate of Bebringer v. Medical Center at Princeton,251 the court considered
claims brought on behalf of an HIV+ otolaryngologist (ENT) against the
medical center where he had staff privileges for breach of its duty to keep his
medical condition confidential and for discrimination. The opinion details the
physician's illness and the response and actions taken by the medical center,
including requiring the physician to disclose his HIV status to surgical patients
252
in order to obtain informed consent.
The court referred to the "reasonable patient" standard in defining informed consent. "The physician's duty is to explain, in words the patient can
understand, that medical information and those risks which are material.
Medical information or a risk of a medical procedure is material when a reasonable patient would be likely to attach significance to it in deciding whether
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 561.
K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. (citations omitted).
592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
See generally id.
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or not to submit to the treatment." 253 The court dismissed the physician's
arguments regarding the remoteness of risk and scope of the informed consent doctrine. 254 The court, applying informed consent law, concluded:
that the risk of accident and implications thereof would be a legitimate concern to the surgical patient, warranting disclosure of this risk
in the informed-consent setting. It is inconsistent with the underlying
policy considerations expressed in Large)25 5 to suggest that the patient
should be informed after the fact of the need for HIV testing and surveillance. 256
The court rejected plaintiffs position, with its lack of concern for patient
257
risk, as "anachronistic paternalism."

4. Pennsylvania
In reApplication ofMilton S. Hershey Medical Center258 considered the propriety of a court order authorizing hospitals to disclose the name and medical
information of an HIV+ Ob-Gyn resident to certain patients and medical
staff members. Although the court was not required to resolve an informed
consent dispute, the Court framed the issue as follows:
[s]hould a patient be told of his/her physician's health status before
consenting to medical care by that professional? In order to make an
informed choice, should not the patient have before him/her all of
the pertinent available information regarding the doctor's qualifications, including the fact that s/he might be carrying a transmittable,
deadly virus? 259
The court did not accept the invitation to answer the question, urging
that "these issues were raised by the non-moving party and their resolution is
not pertinent to the disposition of this appeal." 260 Of interest is that the court
referred to the patient's access to "the doctor's qualifications," 26 1 certainly a
broad "patient as consumer" approach to informed consent.

In Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp.,262 the court considered claims of an HIV+
orthopedic surgeon against health care institutions under the Rehabilitation
Act 263 and the Americans With Disabilities Act 264 after he was prohibited from

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1264-65.
See generaly Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
Estate of William Bebringer,592 A.2d at 1280.
Id. at 1282.
595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 1299 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1299.
Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp. of Southeastern Pa., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (West 1973).
American Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) (West 1990).
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performing surgery without patients' informed consent regarding his HIV
status. This was not a medical negligence claim, and therefore, informed consent was not discussed in that context. The court did note, however, that
"[d]efendants reasonably decided that Dr. Scoles's patients should not undergo an invasive procedure without knowledge of his HIV status."265
D. Physician Qualifications and Training
Patients assume that their physicians are qualified to render care - a reasonable assumption. But some physicians are undoubtedly more qualified
than others. Many physicians are "board certified," typically indicating that
they have completed residency and/or fellowship training and have passed
rigorous examinations. Some "boards" are approved by the American Board
of Medical Specialties (ABMS) 266 and others are not. If membership in an
ABMS recognized board carries greater dignity and weight, is the patient entitied to know that a physician is a member of an "independent board?" Is the
patient entitled to know that "turf battles" exist between plastic and cosmetic
surgery or orthopedic surgery and neurosurgery? Is the surgeon obligated to
advise the patient of the qualifications of the operating room personnel in
order to obtain informed consent?
1. Hawaii
In Ditto v. McCurdy,267 the Supreme Court of Hawaii considered a medical
negligence action against a surgeon in connection with breast augmentation
surgery for the plaintiff, who suffered severe complications. The defendant
surgeon was a board certified ENT who also held board certification from the
American Board of Cosmetic Surgery, a board not recognized by the
ASMS. 268 The defendant did not disclose those qualifications to the plaintiff
in the informed consent process. 269
The Supreme Court noted that Hawaii's informed consent statute270 re
quiring its board of medical examiners to establish informed consent criteria. 27 1 Recognizing this informed consent issue as one of the first impression
in the state, 272 the court held that the surgeon had no duty to disclose his
qualifications. For the criteria to change, the matter would have to be addressed by the Hawaii legislature and board of medical examiners.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 772.
There are twenty-four member boards of the Am. Board of Med. Specialties.
947 P.2d 952, 952 (Haw. 1997).
Id. at 955.
Id. at 955.
HAW. REv. STAT. § 671-3 (West 2008).
Dito, 947 P.2d at 958.

272.

Id.
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2. New York
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division has addressed the
mandatory disclosure of qualifications on multiple occasions. In Zimmerman v.
New York Gty Health and Hospital Cop., 273 the court held that the doctrine of
informed consent, under the circumstances of the case, did not include the
disclosure of "details as to the surgeon's training." 274 The surgeon was a chief
resident. In Abram v. Children's Hospital,275 the court referred to the informed
consent statute 276 and held that "it cannot reasonably be read to require disclosure of qualifications of personnel providing that treatment." 277 Here, the
issue was whether the patient was entitled to a disclosure "that a nurse anesthetist and/or a student physician and/or a resident in obstetrics and gynecology were to participate vitally in the administration of anesthetic during her
surgery." 278 In Johnson v. Jacobowitr,279 the court approved the trial court's order in limine precluding "plaintiff from introducing evidence that [the physicians] did not have the proper credentials to perform the heartport procedure
during the surgery." 280 The doctrine of informed consent did not require the
disclosure of physician qualifications.
3. Washington State
In Thomas v. Wilfa, 281 the state court of appeals considered claims against
a physician who rendered care to the plaintiff in a "walk-in emergency treatment facility." 282 The physician, "a resident in radiology with experience in
emergency room medicine" 283 did not advise the plaintiff that he was not a
specialist in emergency medicine. In referring to the informed consent statute, 284 the court noted that it did not require the "disclosure of a physician's
qualifications." 285

273.
274.
275.

458 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
Id. at 554.
542 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).

276.

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805(d).

277. Abram, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
278. Id. at 418.
279. 884 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
280. Id. at 161.
281. 828 P.2d 597 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
282. Id. at 599.
283. Id.
284. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050(1) (West 1975).
285. Thomas, 828 P.2d at 601.
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E. Participation of Resident Physicians, Physicians Assistants
Physicians in training (residentS286), physician assistantS287 and surgeons'
assistants 288 may participate in surgery. The latter two categories of healthcare
practitioners are not licensed physicians. Is the patient entitled to a disclosure
of the participation of these individuals in the informed consent process?
1. Maryland
In Dingle v. Bein,289 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered an informed consent claim based upon the failure to disclose a resident's participation in gallbladder removal surgery. The patient claimed that had she been
aware of the resident's role, she would not have given consent.290 The defendant surgeon argued that "[c]reating a duty to disclose a resident's precise role
. . . would permit patients to choreograph how an operation is to be per-

formed negating all possibility of informed medical judgment occurring during
the operation." 291 The court recognized only if a physician:
agrees to a specific allocation of responsibility or a specific limitation
on his or her discretion in order to obtain the consent of the patient
to the procedure and then, absent some emergency or other good
cause, proceeds in contravention of that allocation or limitation has
not obtained the informed consent of the patient. 292
Of course, this holding presupposes a discussion with the patient and,
likely, a patient inquiry. It does not obligate the physician to disclose the resident's role to obtain the classic informed consent.
2. New York
In Henry v. Bronx Lebanon Med. Center,293 the court considered an informed consent claim involving the delivery of a child by a second year resident. There were post-delivery complications. 294 At trial, the jury found that
the "failure to get Ms. Henry's consent to have Dr. Umali deliver her baby
286. A resident has been defined as "a physician in an accredited graduate medical education specialty program." Glossay, ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MEDICAL
EDUCATION (2010), http://www.acgme.org/acwebsite/about/abacgmeglossary.pdf.
287. About Physidan Assistants, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTs (2010),
http://www.aapa.org/about-pas.
288. See Official Position on Non-Physiian Surgical Assistants, AM. MED. Ass'N (2010)
http://www.ilsaa.net/aboutus/qualifications.php (discussing the qualifications and duties of
surgeons assistants).
289. 749 A.2d 157 (Md. 2000).
290. Id. at 160.
291. Id. at 163 (internal quotations omitted).
292. Id. at 166.
293. 385 N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1976).
294. Id. at 774.
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under the supervision of Dr. Weinstein" 295 was a proximate cause of the
child's injuries. Here, the court noted that the custom at the hospital was for
residents in training to perform "complicated dehveries." 296 Since the patient
went to that hospital, she "consented to the customs and practices of that
hospital." 297
3. Wisconsin
In Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co., 298 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin considered an informed consent claim pertaining to the performance of coronary
bypass surgery. There was "no dispute that [defendant surgeon] was an experienced cardiovascular surgeon." 299 The issue here was that a physician's assistant assisted the cardiovascular surgeon. Post-operative complications ensued, perhaps due to pre-existing risk factors and post-operative care. The
Court referred to the Wisconsin informed consent statute 3oo and the
Kokemoor301 decision and concluded that the disclosure of the participation of a
physician's assistant at surgery was not required. Essentially, the use of the
physician's assistant did not increase the risk to the patient.
F. Disciplinary History
1. Nebraska
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Curran v. Buser302 addressed the issue
of informed consent and the disclosure of a physician's disciplinary history.
The court referred to the Nebraska informed consent statute303 as encompassing the physician-friendly, professional theory of the doctrine. Physician related disclosures are required "only when mandated by the standard of
care." 304 Since there was a lack of proof that the standard of care required
such a disclosure, evidence pertaining to the physician's disciplinary history
was not relevant to the claim and was inadmissible.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
Id.
No. 02-1729, 2003 WL 22998133 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2003).
Id. at *1.
Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (West 1982).
Seegenerally, Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (1996).
711 N.W.2d 562 (2006).
NIE.B. Rpv. STAT. §§ 44-2816 (West 2004).
Curran, 711 N.W.2d at 572.
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2. Alabama (Dental)

The Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex parte Mendep05 considered a discovery dispute arising from a dental negligence action (among other claims)
brought pursuant to the Alabama Medical Liability Act.3 06 Plaintiff alleged
that the defendant dentist failed to obtain the patient's informed consent to
dental implant surgery by failing to disclose a history of license suspensions
and revocations. 307 The plaintiff issued a subpoena to the Alabama Dental
Board requesting materials, including complaints, pertaining to defendant's
practice of dentistry. 308 The defendant and Dental Board sought to quash the
subpoena. 309 The defendants also moved for summary judgment, urging "that
because a dentist has no common-law or statutory duty to disclose professional reprimands or licensure suspensions or revocations to his patients,
[plaintiffs] 'licensure claims' did not represent cognizable causes of action." 310
Plaintiff also noticed defendant's deposition and the notice requested
that he produce materials pertinent to his dental license suspensions and revocations. This strategy was met by a defense motion to quash or for a protective order. The trial court ultimately ordered the production by the Dental
Board and the defendant dentist. The Alabama Supreme Court's review followed defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus.
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the requested discovery of licensure suspension and revocation materials was appropriate under the state
Medical liability Act 31 ' and rules of civil procedure. 312 Insofar as the Court
reviewed this matter in a discovery dispute posture, it further commented that
"we will assume, but need not decide, that Dr. Mendel owed [plaintiff] a duty
to disclose 'multiple' suspensions or revocations; reprimands by 'numerous'
dental review boards; or suspensions or revocations in 'numerous' states." 313
The court noted as well that the discovery is permissible only if "the revocations or suspensions relate to negligence or professional incompetence in the
practice of dentistry." 314
Physician misconduct that leads to disciplinary action can be severe or
relatively insubstantial. Inadequate record keeping may occupy one end of the
spectrum and criminal conduct the other.315 Licensing board decisions may
305. 942 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 2006).
306. At-A. CODE § 6-5-480 et seq. (West 1975); AiA. CODE § 6-5-540 et seq. (West 1975).
307. Mendel, 942 So. 2d at 832-33.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 832-34.
310. Id. at 833.
311. AiA. CODE. § 6-5-551 (West 1975).
312. AIA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
313. Exparte Mendel, 942 So. 2d 829, 838 (Ala. 2006).
314. Id. at 837.
315. See generally James Morrison & Peter Wickersham, PhysidansDisapined by a State Medcal
Board, 279 J. Am. MED. Ass'N. 1889, 1889-93 (1998) (mentioning the various disciplinary actions
taken).
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be available to the public.3 16 Of course, public information is not a substitute
for disclosure required by the doctrine of informed consent. Patients may not
be aware of publically available information and may not be able to access it.
If a physician's disciplinary history relates to professional competence and
patient safety, mandatory disclosure in the informed consent process is arguable. Hopefully, a physician with this history will simply have his or her practice privileges curtailed. 317
G. FDA Status of Medical Device
If a patient's surgical procedure utilizes the implantation of a device,
perhaps hardware, which is not FDA approved, which is FDA approved for
other purposeS318 or is experimental, must the patient be so advised by the
surgeon in order to provide informed consent?319 Is this a technical aspect of
surgery beyond a patient's comprehension? Does the doctrine of informed
consent "require that a surgeon inform a patient about, or obtain the patient's
consent to, the details or mechanical means of performing an operation?" 320
Courts in a number of states have wrestled with this issue. It should be noted
that a patient enrolled in an experimental study in connection with a device
not yet approved for use by the FDA is entitled to disclosure of the experimental nature of the study.321
1. Florida
In AlvareZ v. Smith, 322 the District Court of Appeal considered a claim involving the implantation of surgical screws in the patient's spine. The surgical
screws were not FDA approved for use in the procedure. 323 The court

316. See Frances H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice-Releasing Physician-Speciic Data to the
Public, 8 Loy. CONSUMER L. Riv. 125, 131 (1995-96).
317. For a case concerning actions by a hospital review board to terminate a physician's
privileges and deny an application for reappointment to the hospital's medical staff due to a
seriously troubled past, see Gabaldoniv. Washington County Hosp., 250 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001).
318. See William H. Maisel, Medical Device Regulation: An Introduction For The Practicing Physician, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MIED. 296, 299-300 (2004) (noting unapproved uses of medical
devices).
319. See James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-label Use, and Informed Consent:
Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 71, 72 (1998) (arguing that FDA
regulatory status should not be discussed with patients as the disclosure would expand the
informed consent doctrine beyond medical matters).
320. See Wachter v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1420, 1424 (D. Md. 1988) (noting that
Maryland law does not name this disclosure), ed 877 F.2d 257 (4th Cit. 1989).
321. See Friter v. lolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (1992).
322. 714 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
323. Id. at 653.
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framed the issue as "whether there was a duty to inform Appellants of the
FDA status of the pedicle screws," 32 4 and answered in the negative.
The court favorably cited the opinion in In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products
Liability Litgation325 for the proposition that disclosure was not required as
FDA "status is not a medical risk of surgery." 326 The court in that case specifically held that "the law of informed consent obligates a physician to advise
a patient of the medical risks, benefits and alternatives directly related to the
patient's operative procedure. The terms 'Class III,' 'investigational,' and 'significant risk' device are terms adopted by the FDA for administrative or regulatory purposes and cannot be said to be risks of a specific surgical procedure." 327 The defense verdict was affirmed.
2. New Jersey
In Bla.oski v. Cook, 328 the court considered a medical negligence action
involving the failure of implanted pedicle screws. The screws utilized were
not FDA approved for the procedure. 329 The Court held that the doctrine of
informed consent did not require disclosure of the FDA status to the patient.330
3. Ohio
In Klein v. Biscup,331 the court considered the informed consent doctrine
and the off-label use of bone plates and bone screws. The court found that
the off-label use of these devices "is not a material risk inherently involved in
a proposed therapy which a physician should disclose to a patient prior to the
therapy." 332 Summary judgment was affirmed.333
4. Pennsylvania
In Corngan v. Methodist Hospital,334 the federal trial court considered a
claim arising from a lumbar spine surgery, which utilized a plate and pedicle
screw system. Plaintiff claimed that her informed consent was not obtained
insofar as she was not advised of the use of the system, the risk of failure, the
324.
325.
107556
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 653.
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liab. Litig., No. 1014, 9408-0002, 1996 WL
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1996).
Alvare.T, 714 So. 2d at 653.
Orthopedic Bone, 1996 WL 107556 at *5.
787 A.2d 910 (N.J. 2002).
Id. at 911.
Id.
673 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 231.
Bla.oski,787 A.2d at 910.
869 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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investigational status of the system and the physicians' financial interest in the
manufacturer of the system. 335 Plaintiff claimed that the surgical procedure
was unnecessary and that the physicians failed to correctly diagnose a spinal
tumor.336
Insofar as the informed consent claim was concerned, the court referred
to Pennsylvania's "prudent patient standard" 337 and the obligation of the jury
to determine the materiality of the undisclosed information. The defendant
physician contended that he was not obligated "to disclose the FDA status of
the VSP Screws." 338
Referring to expert opinions in the case, the court found that it created
"can issue of fact as to whether the undisclosed risk of the investigational status of the VSP bone screws and the undisclosed possibility of additional and
alternate tests would have encouraged [plaintiffl to opt for a different
treatment, and therefore, not suffer her injuries." 339 The court denied the
physician's motion for partial summary judgment.
Not long after Comgan, the federal trial court (in the same district), in In
re OrthopedicBone Screw Products Uability Utigation34 considered another motion
for partial summary judgment in an informed consent claim relating to FDA
regulatory status. Again, this case concerned pedicle screws used in spinal
surgery.
In disagreeing with Comgan, the court found that FDA regulatory status
is not a risk of a procedure341 and that "the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine."342 It distinguished the off-label use of the device in question from the participation of the patient in a clinical investigation. The latter
requires disclosure of the investigational status of a product pursuant to FDA
regulation, not state informed consent law. 343
More recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania followed suit in Southardv. Temple University Hospital.344 This case concerned the non-disclosure of
the FDA regulatory status of bone screws and rods.
The court looked favorably upon the decision in Orthopedic Bone345 and
commented that "[t]he category into which the FDA places the device for
marketing and labeling purposes simply does not enlighten the patient as to
the nature or seriousness of the proposed operation, the organs of the body
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
107556,
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id. at 1206.
Id.
Id. at 1207.
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liab. Litig., No. 1014, 9408-0002, 1996 WL
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1996).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *34.
Southard v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d 101 (Pa. 2001).
Orthopedic Bone, 1996 WL 107556 at *1.
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involved, the disease sought to be cured, or the possible results."346 Therefore, FDA regulatory status is not a topic for mandatory disclosure under the
doctrine of informed consent.
5. South Dakota
In DeNeui v. Wellman,m7 the federal trial court considered defendant's
motion to exclude expert medical testimony implicating a defendant surgeon's
failure to inform the patient of the FDA status of a product he utilized at surgery to enhance bone growth. The expert further opined that the patient's
post-operation problems resulted from the surgical use of the productMS
Without referring to case law concerned with the nature of the FDA status of
products used in surgery, the court essentially relied on the Federal Rules of
Evidence 349 to deny the defendant's motion to exclude the opinion regarding
failure to disclose and informed consent.350
6. Tennessee
In Shadrick v. CentennialMedical Center,35s the court of appeals, in a pedicle
screw, informed consent claim, held that "there is a disputed issue of material
fact as to whether the standard of care in Nashville, Tennessee in 1990 required a disclosure of the lack of FDA approval and the experimental nature
of the use of pedicle screws." 352 The court did not discuss the purpose of
FDA regulatory status. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed Sbadrick.353
There was, likewise, no discussion of FDA status of medical devices.
There have been claims against hospitals for their failure to advise patients of the FDA status of surgical screws. 354 As hospitals do not typically
share the duty of disclosure with physicians, these cases are not discussed
here.

346. Southard, 781 A.2d at 107.
347. No. 07-4172, 2009 WL 3188414, at *1 (D. S.D. Aug. 11, 2009).
348. Id. at *2.
349. FED. R. EVID. 702.
350. DeNeui, 2009 WL 3188414, at *1.
351. No. 01A01-9604-CV-00145,1996 WL 591179, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1996).
352. Id. at *7.
353. Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998).
354. See generally Staudt v. Froedtert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., 580 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998) (patients sued hospital for injuries resulting from use of screws to remedy back problems); Reetz v. Jackson, 176 F.R.D. 412 (D.D.C. 1997) (patient sued doctor and hospital for
failure to inform of risks associated with pedicle screws); Wyttenhove v. Fairview Hosp. &
Healthcare Services, No. C3-97-51, 1997 WL 585813, at *1 (Mvinn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1997)
(FDA was aware of permitted off-label use of screw device, which did not violate FDCA).
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H. Risk of Negligence

Although it stretches legal imagination, courts have considered whether
the doctrine of informed consent requires physicians to disclose the risk that
an appropriate procedure may be negligently performed. In theory, if this is a
required disclosure, the disclosure would occur prior to eveU procedure performed by every physician. Therefore, this topic does not merit close attention.
1. Colorado
The Colorado Supreme Court and the Colorado Court of Appeals have
3 55
had no problem disposing of this "issue." In Mallett v. Pirkey and, very re35 6
cently in Hall v. Frankel, these courts respectively have held that a physician
has no duty to disclose the risk of negligence in the performance of a medical
procedure.
2. GeoTgia
The aforementioned Colorado Supreme Court case 357 refers to Mull v.
Emory University, Inc. 358 Here, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, in questioning
whether the doctrine of informed consent was applicable in Georgia, stated
that it "has no relation to the failure to inform of the hazards of an improper
procedure."35 9 Therefore, Mull does not truly support the Colorado Supreme
Court's position.
I. Statistics
Physicians are often well versed in the statistics pertaining to operative
success and mortality associated with disease. Is this information subject to
the disclosure requirement of informed consent?
1. Cakfornia
In Arato v. Avedon, 360 the Supreme Court of California considered an informed consent claim based upon the defendant's alleged failure to disclose
life expectancy rates for pancreatic cancer patients. Here, a pancreatic tumor
361
The patient was
was incidentally diagnosed during kidney removal surgery.

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

466 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1970).
Hall v. Frankel, 190 P.3d 852 (Colo. App. 2008).
Mallett, 466 P.2d at 466.
150 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
Id. at 292.
858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
Id. at 600.
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referred to an oncology practice for treatment. 362 Prior to the commencement
of therapy, none of the physicians "specifically disclosed to the patient or his
wife the high statistical mortality rate associated with pancreatic cancer." 363
The California Supreme Court "declin[ed] to endorse the mandatory disclosure of life expectancy probabilities." 364 The court considered these statistics impersonal and unreliable, stating, "statistical morbidity values derived
from the experience of population groups are inherently unreliable and offer
little assurance regarding the fate of the individual patient; indeed, to assume
that such data are conclusive in themselves smacks of a refusal to explore
treatment alternatives and the medical abdication of the patient's wellbeing." 365
2. Michigan
In Wlosinksi v. Cohn,366 the Court of Appeals of Michigan considered an
informed consent claim in the context of a kidney transplant. The patient had
post-operative complications and kidney failure. 367 The transplanted kidney
was removed and dialysis was commenced. 368 The patient ceased dialysis and
died. 369
The defendant physician had not disclosed his kidney transplant success
rate to the patient. The court found that the defendant's "success rate was
not a risk related to the medical procedure"370 and "that a physician's raw
success rates do not constitute risk information reasonably related to a patient's medical procedure." 37' The court held that the defendant "did not
have a duty to disclose [his] statistical history of transplant failures to obtain
the decedent's informed consent." 372
The Wlosinski opinion represents good policy. Success rates do not
speak to a particular patient's outcome. Physicians do not desire to discourage patients from seeking treatment, which may be helpful, despite modest
results reported over a large population of patients.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
713 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Wlosinksi v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).

HeinOnline -- 15 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 63 2010-2011

15 MSU JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND LAW 17 (2010)

64
3. Wisconsin

In Kokemoor,373 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered an informed
consent claim in connection with a surgery to repair a brain aneurysm. The
patient suffered post-operative neurological complications. 374 This case has
been previously discussed in the context of physician disclosure of "experience."
A related issue was whether the inexperienced physician was obligated to
disclose surgical morbidity and mortality rates in order to obtain informed
consent. Of significance, based on expert testimony, was that the "morbidity
and mortality rate expected when a surgeon with the defendant's experience
performed the surgery would be significantly higher than the rate expected
when a more experienced physician performed the same surgery."375
The court discussed the risks attendant to the specific surgical procedure
involved - a risky procedure in the most experienced hands. If the patient
was aware that the procedure performed by the inexperienced surgeon carried
a significantly higher risk than that "faced in the hands of another surgeon
performing the same operation, that person might well have elected to forego
surgery with the defendant." 376 The court also alluded to the risk of surgery in
the hands of defendant as greater than a risk attendant to foregoing the surgery. 37 7 Although the court did not wish to adopt a mandatory informed consent comparative risk statistics disclosure rule, it held that under the facts of
the case, "when different physicians have substantially different success rates
with the same procedure and a reasonable person in the patient's position
would consider such information material, the circuit court may admit this
statistical evidence" 378 for the informed consent analysis.

J.

Research, Financial Interests

Physicians may have research interests in their patients. When physicians need patients for research purposes, there is a possibility that treatment
recommendations may be based upon the requirements of the study, not
upon patient needs. Patients may be given unnecessary treatment in order to
fit within the parameters of the study. Physician conflicts of interest may arise
and the issue is whether the patient is entitled to know of the conflict prior to
treatment or enrolling in such a study.

373. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Wis. 1996).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 506.
376. Id. at 506-07.
377. Id. at 507.
378. Id.
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1. Calfornia

The classic case on informed consent and the disclosure of the physician's research and economic interest is Moore v. Regents of the University of California.379 In Moore, the plaintiff underwent treatment for leukemia at UCLA
Medical Center. 380 For diagnostic purposes, plaintiff gave blood, tissue and
other samples and these materials were known by the defendants to be valuable for research purposes. 381 Plaintiffs spleen was removed and portions
were utilized for research. 382 Plaintiff was not informed and his permission
was not sought for this usage.383
The defendants continued their research with plaintiffs cells and a defendant applied for a patent on a cell line established from plaintiffs blood
products. The patent issued and two of the defendants were named as inventors. "With the [university's] assistance, [a defendant] negotiated agreements
for commercial development of the cell line and products to be derived from
it."384

Plaintiffs informed consent claim was characterized by the Supreme
Court of California as follows: "that [the defendant] failed to disclose the extent of his research and economic interests in [plaintiffs] cells before obtain385
ing consent to the medical procedures by which the cells were extracted."
"This cause of action can properly be characterized either as the breach of a
fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient's consent or, alternatively, as the performance of medical procedure without first having obtained
the patient's informed consent." 386
The court had no trouble expanding the doctrine of informed consent to
include the disclosure of "personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional
judgment." 387 The reasonable patient would desire this information prior to
388
giving consent to treatment.
2. Florida
In Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute,389 the federal
court considered informed consent and other claims brought by parents of ill

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

793 P.2d 479, 479 (Cal. 1990).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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children and "non-profit organizations that provided funding and information
to Defendants to research and discover the Canavan disease gene." 390
Through blood and tissue donation, defendants were able to isolate the offending gene and, without advising plaintiffs, submitted a patent application
which identified one of the defendants as inventor. 391 The patent was issued. 392 The court distinguished Moore, insofar as it concerned a nondisclosure within the physician-patient relationship. 393 Here, the potential
disclosure recipients were non-patient providers of information. 394 They were
not "objects of human experimentation." 395 "[T]he voluntary nature of their
submissions warrants different treatment." 396 The doctrine of informed consent did not apply.
3. Illinois
In Neade v. Portes,397 the Supreme Court of Illinois refused to recognize a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against a physician for failure to disclose his
financial incentive derived from the patient's HMO. 398 The court simply believed that the fiduciary claim was repetitive of the medical negligence claim.
The court also noted that the Illinois Managed Care Act 399 "requires that
managed care organizations disclose physician incentive plans to patients."400
Of course, this disclosure requirement does not pertain to the physician.
4. Minnesota
In D.A.B. v. Brown,401 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota considered an
appeal from the dismissal of a class action complaint alleging, among other
390.
391.

392.
393.
394.

Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1070-73.

Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1064.

395. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1071
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
396. Id.
397. 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000).
398. See Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competiion, Integrated Deivery Systems and Andtrust, 79
CoRui, L. Riv. 1507, 1520 (1993-94) (noting that "physicians are employees or are paid
through capitated payments and other financial arrangements that serve to align their incentives
with those of the HMO"). For a recent decision in which the Appellate Court of Illinois approved the introduction into evidence of financial motive insofar as it addressed compliance
with the standard of care, see Martinet v. Elias, 922 N.E.2d 457, 466 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (concluding that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the evidence of financial
motive to be introduced in a limited and specific manner to address the issue of the defendants'
compliance with the standard of care').
399. 215 11. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/15(b) (West 1999).
400. Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 504.
401. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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claims, a failure to disclose a Medicaid/Medicare kickback scheme against a
physician and others. The court characterized "[t]he doctor's duty to disclose
the kickback scheme [as presenting] a classic informed consent issue."402 The
claim was insufficient for other reasons.
VI. AFTERTHOUGHTS: ADDITIONAL REASONS WHY THE LAW OF
INFORMED CONSENT SHOULD ASSIST THE PATIENT IN BECOMING A
CONSUMER

Even filing and prosecuting a medical negligence lawsuit against a physician may not improve a patient's chances of obtaining performance and quality information regarding a defendant physician. State and federal statutory
schemes may operate as impediments to the discovery of information patients
may desire to examine.
A. State Peer Review Statutes
The Illinois Medical Studies Act4*3 essentially protects from discovery
and the admission into evidence, among other things, peer review information
and information regarding morbidity and mortality, and quality assurance.
The purpose of the Act is to 'encourage candid and voluntary studies
and programs used to improve hospital conditions and patient care
or to reduce the rates of death and disease' . . . [t]he Act is premised

on the belief that, absent the privilege, physicians might be reluctant
to sit on peer-review committees and engage in frank evaluations of
their colleagues.404
The Medical Studies Act does not, however, "protect against the discovery of information generated before the peer-review process begins or
information generated after the peer-review process ends."05 Other examples
of similar statutes are those in Iowa,406 Massachusetts, 07 Minnesota,408
Pennsylvania409 and Tennessee. 410
These statutes provide a valuable
protection to the physician peer review process and foster the hospital selfpolicing process. Of course, it is precisely the type of information protected
by these statutes that patients would like to know.

402. Id. at 171.
403. 735 Ilu. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-2101 (West 2004); 735 lu.1 COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/82102 (West 2004).
404. Anderson v. Rush-Copley Med. Ctr., Inc., 894 N.E.2d 827, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
405. Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 718 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
406. IowA CODE ANN. 5 147.135 (West 1975).
407. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 204 (West 2007).
408. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.64 (West 2003).
409. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §425.4 (West 1974).
410. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (West 1967).
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B. The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)
The NPDB is a statutory and regulatory creature 411 through which "medical malpractice payers" 412 "[m]ust report payments made for the benefit of
physicians . . . in settlement of or in satisfaction in whole or in part of a claim

or judgment against such practitioner." 413 The public has no access to this
information as the "routine uses of NPDB information, which are consistent
with the law and the regulations under which it operates, do not include
disclosure to the general public." 414 The NPDB is utilized by healthcare institutions in the credentialing process. 4 15
VII. CONCLUSION
If patients are to be consumers of health care, they need access to quality, performance and other information personal to their physicians. Influential, voluntary medical associations have not been as patient-friendly as they
could be regarding physician disclosures and informed consent. If the historic
pronouncement of Canterbury v. Spence' 1 6 is to have meaning, patients will likely
need more than sporadic judicial opinions to shape the doctrine of informed
consent. Informed consent statutes encompassing the disclosure of providerspecific information would assist in allowing patients to receive significant
information at a time when they most need it.
There are, of course, problems with expansion of the doctrine of informed consent. One is "information overload." How much information can
a patient process? Another is "time." How much time should a physician
spend in obtaining informed consent? Another concern is patient status. Is
the patient medicated? Is the patient in pain? Is the informed consent process occurring on the precipice of a procedure? These issues relate to the patient's ability to absorb information disclosed by physicians. Yet another concern is an attempt to cover physician-specific information in an informed
consent document. 417 Can a patient effectively read and understand such a
document? This problem implicates the issue of "health literacy."418
411. See Div. OF QUALITY ASSURANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEAi.TH & HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK GUIDEBOOK app. B-1, (2001), http://www.npdbhipdb.hrsa.gov/pubs/gb/NPDBGuidebook.pdf (listing seven links to various laws and regulations).
412. Id. at app. A-3.
413. Id. at C-2.
414. Id. at A-6.
415. Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Hospital Peer Review and the National Practitioner Data Bank:
ClinicalPirvilegesAction Reports, 281 J. AM. MED. ASs'N. 349, 354 (1999).
416. 464 F.2d 772, 776 n. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
417. Krumholz, supra note 53, at 1191.
418. Richard S. Safeer & Jann Keenan, Health Iiterag: The Gap Between P/3sicians & Patients,
72 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 463 (2005); Mark V. Williams et al., The Role of Health iterag in PadentPhysidan Communication,34 FAM. MED. 383 (2002).
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It is easy to conclude that patients simply lack the wherewithal to process
more information and that physicians should spend their time providing
treatment. This approach is unsatisfactory. Patients should have access to
information about their physicians, which, at least, approaches information
available about consumer products. If modern informed consent focuses on
"patient centered care," 419 more information should be disclosed. In order for
patients to choose good physicians, they need information indicating which
physicians are good.

419.

Krumholz, supra note 53, at 1191.
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